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RENT-A-TRIBE: USING TRIBAL IMMUNITY TO SHIELD 
PATENTS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Seth W. R. Brickey* 
Abstract: In 2017, Allergan Pharmaceuticals entered into an agreement with the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe (SRMT). Allergan agreed to assign several patents to SRMT and to pay 
an initial sum of $13.75 million and annual royalties of approximately $15 million. SRMT, in 
exchange, licensed the rights to use the patents back to Allergan and agreed not to waive its 
tribal immunity in any administrative proceeding challenging the patents. Two outcomes were 
expected as a result of this Allergan-Mohawk agreement. First, Allergan would retain the rights 
to manufacture and market a highly profitable drug while insulating the underlying patents 
from an unforgiving administrative inter partes review (IPR). Second, SRMT would embark 
on a new business venture of collecting and relicensing patents from third parties, effectively 
“renting out” its sovereign immunity. The response from lawmakers, the judiciary, the 
executive branch, and the public at large was acrimonious. The agreement was branded in 
public forums as a “sham” and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board held the patents assigned to 
SRMT were not shielded by tribal immunity. This Comment argues the Allergan-Mohawk 
agreement is a legally effective means of avoiding IPR. Absent an express waiver of tribal 
immunity by Congress or the tribe itself, a tribe may not be subject to a private claim. This rule 
extends to IPR proceedings which closely parallel private suits. Therefore, contracts like the 
Allergan-Mohawk agreement effectively shield patents from IPR. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (SRMT) is a federally recognized tribe 
in upstate New York.1 Located in one of the State’s poorer counties, 
SRMT has an estimated 22.6% unemployment rate with 21.9% of 
individuals falling below the poverty line.2 Currently, the Tribe boasts 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank 
Professor Robert Anderson for his guidance, edits, and input. I would also like to thank the fantastic 
members of Washington Law Review, without whom this piece would not be possible. 
1. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. BIA, 81 Fed. Reg. 
5019, 5022 (Jan. 29, 2016). 
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Selected Community Characteristics, AM. FACTFINDER, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml [https://perma.cc/A9N9-CZK4] (search 
“St. Regis Mohawk Reservation, Franklin County, New York;” then select “Income” button; then 
follow “Selected Economic Characteristics” hyperlink) (last visited Jul. 22, 2018); “The 
unemployment rate, for example, hovers around 50 percent for Indians who live on reservations, 
nearly ten times that for the nation as a whole, and almost one third of American Indians live in 
poverty.” Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bondage: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal 
Economic Development 2 (U. Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers Archive 2003–2009, 
2006). 
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three economic enterprises organized as tribally owned limited liability 
companies: the Mohawk Gaming Enterprises, Mohawk Networks, and 
Akwesasne TV.3 In 2017, the Tribe added a new form of enterprise to its 
economic portfolio through its Office of Technology, Research, and 
Patents (OTRP).4 The OTRP contemplates that “[t]he Tribe will manage 
the acquisition of intellectual property from third parties, and the [sic] 
maintain and license the acquired legally protected intellectual property” 
and create wealth, jobs, sponsored research, and economic development 
opportunities for SRMT.5 
According to SRMT, OTRP’s business model commences when the 
Tribe acquires a patent from a non-tribal company.6 Next, in exchange for 
royalties and prearranged fees, the Tribe will license the patent back to 
the assigning company while retaining actual ownership.7 Finally, if a 
competitor challenges the patent, the Tribe agrees to assert its sovereign 
immunity to avoid review by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO).8 The Tribe claims tribal ownership of patents to avoid the 
“unfair” administrative processes which “allow[ ] patent trolls and other 
infringers to void valid patents.”9 Instead, challengers to a patent must 
raise a claim for invalidity in federal court, a process which relies on 
standards more favorable to a patent’s validity.10 
This business plan is the brainchild of Michael Shore of the Dallas law 
firm, Shore, Chan, and DePumpo LLP, who approached SRMT with this 
enterprise.11 The Shore firm agreed to prosecute infringers of tribally held 
                                                     
3. Enterprises, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/enterprises 
[https://perma.cc/CG6S-VU4P]. 
4. SRMT Office of Technology, Research and Patents (“OTRAP”), SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, 
https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/OTRAP-Website-Blurb.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7AA-
V625]. 
5. Id.  
6. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Frequently Asked Questions About New Research and Technology 
(Patent) Business, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-
nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/Office-of-Technology-Research-and-Patents-FAQ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SVZ7-8VWH]. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See id.; Adam Davidson, Why Is Allergan Partnering with the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe?, NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/20/why-is-allergan-
partnering-with-the-st-regis-mohawk-tribe [https://perma.cc/55HB-Q6RD]; Steve Brachmann, 
Allergan’s Patent Transaction with St. Regis Mohawks Could Presage More Arbitrage Patent 
Transactions, IPWATCHDOG (Sep. 18, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/18/allergans-
patent-transaction-with-st-regis-mohawks-could-presage-more-arbitrage-patent-
transactions/id=87970/ [https://perma.cc/P3TH-EW2E] (quoting Michael Shore) (“If you can avoid 
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patents on a contingent basis, sharing in the potential damages recovered 
from the assigned patents.12 The Tribe anticipates “it will earn a 
significant amount of money through the Shore firm’s enforcement of the 
patents in federal court.”13 Beginning in April 2017, the Tribe began 
approaching patent-holding companies and entering into assignment 
agreements.14 The first agreement was with a company that held patents 
for computer technologies and which assigned forty individual patents to 
the Tribe.15 These agreements went without challenge until SRMT entered 
into an agreement with Allergan, which transferred ownership of a patent 
for a billion-dollar product to the Tribe.16 
On August 24, 2015, Allergan, an Irish pharmaceutical company, filed 
a patent infringement suit against Teva Pharmaceuticals and several other 
generic manufacturers.17 The complaint alleged the defendants had been 
producing and marketing a generic version of Restasis, one of Allergan’s 
patented products, before the patent lapsed.18 In December 2016, at the 
request of the generic manufacturers, the USPTO’s Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted six separate inter partes reviews.19 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 201120 established inter 
partes review (IPR).21 IPR allows for the PTAB to rescind a patent based 
on a showing of invalidity.22 The IPR process, discussed further in Part II, 
is an adversarial process where a party may challenge the validity of a 
patent. The patent challenger and the patent holder appear before the 
PTAB to present evidence, examine witnesses, and give arguments to 
                                                     
IPRs, there’s a huge value difference between patents which can be subject to IPRs and patents that 
are not . . . a significant enough difference that if you can find a sovereign which is willing to take 
advantage of that arbitrage, there is money to be made there.”). 
12. SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, supra note 6, at 2. 
13. Id.  
14. Id. 
15. Id.; see also Joe Mullin, Apple Is Being Sued for Patent Infringement by a Native American 
Tribe, ARS TECHNICA (Sep. 27, 2017, 5:11 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/apple-
is-being-sued-for-patent-infringement-by-a-native-american-tribe/ [https://perma.cc/5NJT-CNU5]. 
16. See infra notes 32–41. 
17. Complaint, Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 
2015). 
18. Id. at 4–5. 
19. Gene Quinn, PTAB Institutes Mylan IPR Challenges on Allergan Patents for 
Restasis, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/13/ptab-institutes-
mylan-ipr-allergan-patents-restasis/id=75645/ [https://perma.cc/UY97-ARGN]. 
20. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
at amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
21. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018). 
22. Id.  
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support or attack the patent’s validity.23 Then the PTAB may issue a 
binding ruling which either affirms the patent’s validity or rescinds some 
or all of the patent’s claims.24 Congress intended IPR to benefit patent 
challengers, as the administrative proceeding is often far less costly than 
litigation in a federal court.25 
After nine months of IPR, Allergan assigned the patents-in-suit to 
SRMT.26 The Tribe received an initial payment of $13.75 million and the 
promise of annual royalties of up to $15 million for the life of the 
patents.27 In exchange, SRMT granted Allergan an exclusive license to 
manufacture, market, and sell the drug.28 The Tribe promised it would not 
waive its tribal immunity “in relation to any inter partes review or any 
other proceeding in the [USPTO] or any administrative 
proceeding . . . filed for the purpose of invalidating or rendering 
unenforceable any [a]ssigned [p]atents.”29 Allergan plainly admitted the 
purpose of the agreement was to defeat the “unfair” IPR process and 
preserve the validity of its patents against administrative attack.30 
Pursuant to its agreement, SRMT intervened in the IPR proceedings and 
moved to dismiss those proceedings based on the assertion of the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity.31 
                                                     
23. See infra Part II.  
24. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
25. Press Release, White House, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the 
Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs 
Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim 
[https://perma.cc/VQJ3-Y8CC]. 
26. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Notice Regarding Document Prod. According to the 
Court’s Oct. 6, 2017 Order at Exhibit A, Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Allergan, Response to Defendants’ Notice]. Exhibit A contains 
the executed Short Form Patent Assignment at issue in this case.  
27. See id; Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements Regarding RESTASIS® 
Patents, ALLERGAN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.allergan.com/News/News/Thomson-
Reuters/Allergan-and-Saint-Regis-Mohawk-Tribe-Announce-Agr [https://perma.cc/5YYM-HA39]. 
28. Supra note 26. 
29. Id.  
30. Meg Tirrell, Senators Question Allergan CEO on Tribe Patent Deal, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2017, 
6:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/07/senators-question-allergan-ceo-on-tribe-patent-
deal.html [https://perma.cc/H2KB-ZU2H] (“Allergan is not attempting to artificially extend patents, 
we’re trying to protect our investment in intellectual property against a system that exposes our 
products to the double jeopardy created by the unfair IPR process.”). 
31. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2017-00576, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018), aff’d, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 18-1638 (Fed. 
Cir. Jul. 20, 2018). 
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Subsequently, Allergan moved to join the SRMT in its suit against 
Teva Pharmaceuticals in federal court in the Southern District of Texas.32 
The defendants vehemently objected, arguing Allergan “admitted in other 
forums that the intent is to employ Native American sovereign immunity 
and attempt to cut-off pending validity challenges with the Patent 
Office.”33 The defendants accused Allergan of “attempting to misuse 
Native American sovereignty to shield invalid patents from 
cancellation.”34 After reviewing the document regarding the patent 
assignment, the court “ha[d] serious concerns about the legitimacy of the 
tactic that Allergan and the Tribe . . . employed.”35 “The essence of the 
matter is this: Allergan purports to have sold the patents to the Tribe, but 
in reality it paid the Tribe to allow Allergan to purchase—or perhaps more 
precisely, to rent—the Tribe’s sovereign immunity . . . .”36 To ensure the 
judgment would not be challenged for the absence of a necessary party, 
the court allowed the joinder.37 However, the court announced that, even 
though it was allowing the joinder, it was not holding that the assignment 
was valid.38 
Allergan’s strategy of renting tribal sovereignty in order to protect its 
patents caused a rancorous response from legal practitioners, the broader 
public, and from members of every branch of the federal government. 
Some saw the maneuver as an abuse of SRMT’s immunity or a “sham,” 
while others viewed it as an emerging market aimed at invigorating tribes’ 
struggling economies.39 Lawmakers reacted quickly. Less than a month 
after the Allergan-Mohawk agreement was made public, Senator 
McCaskill proposed a bill that would abrogate tribal sovereignty for 
                                                     
32. Plaintiff’s Opposed Mot. to Join Party Pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 25(c), Allergan, Inc. 
v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2017). 
33. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. Id. at 4. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 9. 
38. Id. at 10. 
39. Compare David Mitchell, Allergan Invokes Victim Defense to Protect Restasis from Generic 
Challenge, STAT (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/25/allergan-restasis-patent-
generic/ [https://perma.cc/JS3F-XBAV] (“This sham would hurt thousands of American patients who 
tell us they are forgoing other medications and even food to pay for Restasis because there is no 
cheaper generic.”), with Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native American 
Tribe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/health/allergan-patent-
tribe.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2018) (“For the Mohawk tribe . . . the deal offers the promise of a 
new revenue stream that would bring in income beyond that of a casino the tribe runs near the 
reservation.”). 
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IPR.40 Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, 
Makan Delrahim, suggested criminal charges might be brought against 
companies who assigned patents to tribes in order to escape IPR.41 
Allergan is not the only company seeking to exploit this would-be 
loophole. Nor is SRMT the only tribal entity seeking to benefit from this 
new market. Amidst this fervor, the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation 
of North Dakota revealed it had been assigned a patent by a technology 
firm and would become the named plaintiff in a related infringement suit 
against Apple.42 
This Comment argues that, under current federal Indian law, the 
agreements between the tribal assignees and the non-tribal assignors are a 
lawful and effective method of avoiding IPR. Congress should avoid 
hastily undermining these agreements and allow these tribal-private 
partnerships to boost tribes’ revenue. This Comment proceeds in four 
parts. Part I traces the development of tribal immunity under federal 
Indian law and discusses the bounds of tribal immunity as illuminated by 
recent and pending Supreme Court decisions. Part II looks to the IPR 
process under the America Invents Act and whether its operation or 
legislative intent waives tribal immunity and whether there are alternative 
methods of challenging a patents validity before the USPTO. Part III 
addresses the law underlying the argument that the Allergan-Mohawk 
agreement is a “sham,” discussing what constitutes a “sham” agreement 
under prevailing contract theory. Part IV argues that, considering the 
current breadth of tribal immunity, the Allergan-Mohawk agreement is an 
effective means of avoiding IPR until Congress decides otherwise. 
                                                     
40. Michael Erman, Senator McCaskill Drafts Bill in Response to Allergan Patent Maneuver, 
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2017, 11:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents-
congress/senator-mccaskill-drafts-bill-in-response-to-allergan-patent-maneuver-idUSKBN1CA2D0 
[https://perma.cc/QF9Y-MCVP] (“Any thinking person would look at what this company did and say, 
‘That should be illegal.’ Well, I agree . . . .”); see also Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Outraged at Senator 
McCaskill’s Attempt to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/news/2017/saint-regis-mohawk-tribe-outraged-at-senator-mccaskills-
attempt-to-abrogate-sovereign-immunity [https://perma.cc/ZS8Z-GHNQ]. 
41. Charles McConnell, Delrahim: Patent Transfer May Have Been a Crime, GLOB. COMPETITION 
REVIEW (Jan. 19, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1152913/delrahim-patent-
transfer-may-have-been-a-crime [https://perma.cc/JY8N-GVUC]. 
42. Mullin, supra note 15. 
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I. EXAMINING THE ORIGINS AND SCOPE OF TRIBAL 
IMMUNITY 
Under the doctrine of tribal immunity, federally recognized Indian 
tribes are generally immune from suit in both federal and state courts.43 
Sovereign immunity emerged from customs of international law which 
dictate par in parem no habet imperium: between equals no power.44 
Under this presumption of equality, a sovereign nation generally may not 
be placed under the jurisdiction of another.45 The constitutional framers 
understood this general principal of law.46 The Supreme Court has since 
found tribal immunity is “a necessary corollary” to tribal sovereignty.47 
Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, provided for under customary 
international law, and unlike State sovereign immunity, which is 
constitutionally guaranteed under the Eleventh Amendment, tribal 
immunity exists as a creature of federal common law.48 Furthermore, 
Congress has plenary power to shape, limit, or abrogate tribal immunity.49 
Courts have continually wrestled with how to clarify the bounds of tribal 
immunity in relation to the authority of the federal government, the 
interests of States, and the rights of private actors.50 The arc of Indian law 
jurisprudence has, in recent years, bent in favor of tribal immunity.51 
Part I analyzes the development of tribal immunity. First, it looks at 
tribal sovereignty and traces its early developments. Second, it examines 
the scope of tribal immunity as drawn by the courts. Third, it looks to 
                                                     
43. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 645 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012). 
44. Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in 
Contemporary Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1151, 1152 (2015). 
45. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
99 (Feb. 3). 
46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“It is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable” to suit without consent). 
47. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986). 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. 
Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758–60 (1998) (“Although the Court has taken the lead in drawing 
the bounds of tribal immunity, Congress, subject to constitutional limitations, can alter its limits 
through explicit legislation.”); see Eric T. Kohan, Comment, A Natural Progression of Restrictive 
Immunity: Why the JASTA Amendment Does Not Violate International Law, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
1515, 1520 (2017) (“Sovereign immunity is a part of customary international law . . . .”). 
49. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758–60. 
50. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030–39 (2014) 
(examining whether a state may sue a tribe for hosting off-reservation gambling in violation of state 
law). 
51. See id. 
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Congress’s policy choices to abrogate tribal immunity in some 
circumstances and to leave it undisturbed in others. 
A. The Development of Tribal Sovereignty 
At its core, tribal immunity is a vestige of tribal sovereignty—a tribe’s 
political character and inherent authority to govern themselves.52 Yet, 
from the Court’s perspective, the doctrine of tribal immunity “developed 
almost by accident.”53 This section traces the extent of tribal sovereignty 
from an inherent pre-colonial status, to a “discovered” people, and lastly 
to “domestic dependent nations” within the United States. 
1. Discovered Peoples 
Prior to European colonization, American Indian tribes were wholly 
sovereign nations.54 Chief Justice Marshall stated, “America, separated 
from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided 
into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the 
world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their 
own laws.”55 However, gradual changes to tribes’ legal status led to their 
subordination under the United States government.56 
Even after colonization, the tribes engaged in activities expected of a 
sovereign. They traded,57 ceded territory,58 entered into treaties,59 and 
formed military alliances.60 American née British practice demonstrates 
an understanding of tribes’ political character and inherent sovereignty. 
The British Crown and provincial governments entered into numerous 
                                                     
52. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 476 U.S. at 890 (characterizing immunity 
as “a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance”). 
53. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756. 
54. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545 (1823). 
55. Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515, 542–43 (1832). 
56. See, e.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 545 (holding that the United States government had 
superior title to lands within the United States than the tribes which originally possessed the land). 
57. Jennifer Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 5, 11–12 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992). 
58. Id.  
59. See generally CARL VAN DOREN, INDIAN TREATIES PRINTED BY BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1736–
1762 (1938) (for examples of treaties of colonial governments); see also CHARLES J. KAPPLER, 
INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (1904) (a compilation of all recorded treaties between the 
United States government and Indian tribes between 1788 and 1883). 
60. Articles of Agreement and Confederation, U.S.-Delaware Nation, Sep. 17, 1778, 
 in 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3 (1904). 
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treaties with tribes as foreign sovereigns.61 Treating is an implicit “nation-
to-nation form of intergovernmental interaction” between two or more 
sovereigns.62 The tribes were likewise recognized as distinct political 
communities through treaties by the newly independent United States 
government.63 
The Constitution also afforded recognition to tribes as separate entities. 
Article I, Section 8 states, “Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with 
the Indian tribes.”64 While recognizing Indian tribes as being distinct from 
both “foreign nations” and “states,” this provision suggests Indian tribes 
were also sovereign like foreign nations and the States. 
Despite this early recognition of tribal sovereignty, Americans’ 
westward ambitions soon became incompatible with the recognition of 
tribal independence. President George Washington stated in 1783, “the 
gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause the Savage as 
the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ in shape.”65 
Later, in a letter to Andrew Jackson, President James Monroe echoed this 
sentiment stating, “[i]t has become customary to purchase the title of the 
Indian tribes, for a valuable consideration . . . [a] compulsory process 
seems to be necessary, to break their habits.”66 
The United States’s growing impatience with the slow process of 
acquiring tribal land via treaty and purchase came to a head in the courts. 
In Johnson v. M’Intosh,67 a title dispute allowed the Court to deal a 
crippling blow to tribal sovereignty.68 The plaintiffs in error had inherited 
land originally purchased from the Piankeshaw tribe, while the defendant, 
M’Intosh, was later given title to the land by the United States 
                                                     
61. COHEN, supra note 43 at 14–15. 
62. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law 
and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 9 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP04-016, 2004). 
63. Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme Court’s Changing Stance on Tribal 
Sovereignty, COMPLETE LAWYER, Fall 1995, at 14–17; see generally KAPPLER, supra note 59.  
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
65. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, 140 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938). 
66. Letter from James Monroe to Andrew Jackson (Oct. 5, 1870), in THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JACKSON: 1816-1820, 144–48 (Harold D. Moser et al. eds., 1994). 
67. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545 (1823). 
68. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 42–43 (2d 
ed. 2010). 
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government.69 The Court was tasked with determining who had superior 
title to the parcels at issue.70 
The Court concluded the tribal sale of land was ineffective.71 Upon the 
European discovery of the Americas, the Court claimed, the “superior 
genius” of Europe entitled the discovering powers to extend their 
sovereignty over the lands and inhabitants they discovered.72 Therefore, 
tribes lacked the sovereign capacity to dispense of the land they occupied, 
and the defendant’s federally granted claim to the land was superior.73 
Through the Court’s disposition in Johnson v. M’Intosh, tribal sovereignty 
and the trappings of sovereignty, such as sovereign immunity, were 
subjugated to the political control of the United States. 
2. Domestic Dependent Nations 
As a result of the Court’s remarks in Johnson v. M’Intosh, that even if 
“the Indians were originally an independent people, they ha[d] ceased to 
be so,”74 the Court had placed a definitive ceiling on tribal sovereignty.75 
They were next tasked with determining the finer boundaries of the 
doctrine. The opportunity arose in 1831 in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.76 
Cherokee Nation followed a series of laws passed by Georgia to 
dispossess the Cherokee of tribally held lands within Georgia’s borders, 
to eliminate the tribe’s right to self-rule within the state, and, in effect, to 
evict them from the State in order to allow increased white settlement.77 
The Cherokee Nation responded by petitioning the Supreme Court 
directly, claiming it had original jurisdiction over the dispute under 
Article III of the Constitution.78 Article III, Section 2 states the Court has 
original jurisdiction over “controversies . . . between a state, or the 
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.”79 To decide the 
                                                     
69. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 545. 
70. Id.  
71. Id.  
72. Id. at 573. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 568.  
75. Id. 
76. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
77. ARTHUR FOSTER, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 126–29 (1831); MARY 
BETH NORTONM, 1 A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 288 (2d ed. 1986) 
(“[T]he Georgia legislature annulled the [Cherokees’] constitution, extended the state’s sovereignty 
over [them], and ordered the seizure of tribal lands.”). 
78. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1. 
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the dispute, the Court had to 
determine whether the Cherokee tribe was a State or “foreign nation” 
entitled to sue, or some other type of entity outside of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.80 
Chief Justice Marshall writing for the majority distinguished tribes 
within the boundaries of the United States as “domestic dependent 
nations” rather than being denominated as “independent” or “foreign 
nations.”81 While tribes may possess a right to occupy the land, their 
“relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian” 
rather than foreign sovereigns.82 Because the framers did not intend to 
confer the status of foreign statehood on Indian tribes, Chief Justice 
Marshall reasoned, they are subordinate to the United States government 
and incapable of bringing suit.83 
Forty years later, Congress echoed the Court’s determination in the 
Indian Appropriations Act.84 Under the legislation, Congress declared 
“[n]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall 
be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation . . . with whom 
the United States may contract by treaty.”85 While more modern cases 
have emphasized that tribes enjoy the right to self-government, none have 
claimed the right exists free of congressional allowance. Through the 
preceding changes, tribal sovereignty was transformed from a pre-
colonial intrinsic political identity to a status conferred and controlled at 
the discretion of Congress. 
B. Tribal Immunity 
Tribal immunity has been diminished less than other aspects of tribal 
sovereignty.86 Tribal immunity is “a necessary corollary to Indian 
sovereignty and self-governance.”87 In fact, the Court continued to 
recognize tribal immunity long after absolute tribal sovereignty had been 
abridged.88 The first case in which the Court implicitly grappled with 
                                                     
80. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1–2. 
81. Id. at 17. 
82. Id.  
83. Id. at 18. 
84. See Indian Appropriation Act of 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 71 (1871)). 
85. 25 U.S.C. § 71.  
86. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986). 
87. Id. 
88. See, e.g., id. at 891 (recognizing that, absent a waiver, tribal immunity protects tribes from suit). 
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tribal immunity was Park v. Ross,89 in 1850.90 The case involved a private 
claim against a Chief of the Cherokee Nation for the payment of a debt 
allegedly owed by the nation.91 The Court held where the Chief was acting 
as an agent of the tribe, he was not personally liable for the contracts made 
within the scope of his authority given the quasi-foreign character of 
tribes.92 
Tribal immunity was explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in the 
1919 decision Turner v. United States,93 in which a non-Indian sued the 
Creek Nation for damages resulting from the destruction of property by 
tribal members, alleging the Tribe was liable for failing to maintain 
order.94 The Court found a court could not assign liability “by the general 
law” because “[l]ike other governments, municipal as well as state, the 
Creek Nation was free from liability for injuries to persons or property 
due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace.”95 
The Court later clarified that tribal immunity, unlike forms of sovereign 
immunity possessed by States, was not inherent nor unqualified.96 In 
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,97 the Court held 
“Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional 
authorization.”98 Tribal immunity was not a feature of some inherent 
sovereignty the tribes retained, but rather “was theirs as sovereigns passed 
to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.”99 Under 
cases like U.S. Fidelity, the Court ceded to Congress plenary power under 
the Indian Commerce Clause to regulate tribes’ immunity.100 Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution is the main source of federal power over 
tribes and is the primary vehicle Congress employs to enhance or abrogate 
                                                     
89. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 363–79 (1850). 
90. William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereignty Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1587, 1640 (2013) (citing Park, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 363–79). 
91. Park, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 363–79. 
92. Id. at 374. 
93. 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 357 (emphasis added). 
96. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (noting a trend “away from the 
idea of inherent Indian sovereignty . . . toward reliance on federal pre-emption”). But see Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (reflecting the 
modern trend of recognizing tribal sovereignty as “inherent”). 
97. 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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tribal immunity.101 Furthermore, because tribal sovereignty or immunity, 
unlike States’, is not guaranteed by the Constitution, Congress’s power to 
abrogate or enlarge it is presumably unlimited.102 
In recent history, the Court has examined the scope of tribal immunity 
through several lenses. First, a notable line of cases concerns the 
definition of “tribe” for the purposes of tribal immunity, namely what 
people, entities, and property enjoy the protection of a tribe’s immunity.103 
Second, the Court looks to whether the geographic or commercial 
character of the tribe’s activity affects the tribe’s immunity.104 Third, the 
Court considers whether sovereign immunity extends to administrative as 
well as judicial proceedings.105 This section addresses each dimension of 
tribal immunity in turn. 
1. Who Enjoys the Protection of Tribal Immunity? 
Sovereign immunity from suits generally extends to tribes.106 Certain 
plaintiffs have a greater degree of latitude in suing tribes directly. For 
example, tribes are not immune from suits brought by the federal 
government.107 However, as a general rule, tribes enjoy sovereign 
                                                     
101. See Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1014 
(2014). 
102. See Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The 
Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 13 (2002) 
(“[W]hen Lone Wolf embraced the notion that congressional abrogation of an Indian treaty is a 
political question unresolvable in domestic courts, the Court left tribes without a remedy to prevent 
the abrogation and without hope of retrospective relief for the consequences of the abrogation unless 
they successfully beseeched the tender mercies of a later Congress.”). 
103. See, e.g., Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2017) (examining whether an 
employee of a tribe being sued for negligence was protected by the tribe’s immunity). 
104. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 752 (1998) (examining 
whether an off-reservation commercial transaction between a tribe and a non-Indian company was a 
waiver of tribal immunity). 
105. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753–61 (2002) 
(examining whether state sovereign immunity extended to privately instituted administrative 
proceedings). 
106. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754. 
107. Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459–60 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1987) (“We conclude that just as a state may not assert sovereign 
immunity as against the federal government . . . . Tribal sovereign immunity may not be asserted 
against the United States . . . .”) (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140–41 (1965)); 
William C. Canby, Jr., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 102 (3d ed. 2015) (“Tribes are not immune from suits 
by the United States.”). 
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immunity from suits brought by states and private parties.108 The Court 
has grappled with what and who constitutes a “tribe” for immunity 
purposes.109 As part of their right to self-governance, tribal governments 
maintain the power to determine their own governance structures and law 
enforcement, albeit with federal involvement in some areas.110 Therefore, 
because the 567 federally recognized tribes111 are each entitled to structure 
themselves as they see fit—establishing governing bodies, creating 
offices, and hiring employees—there is a question as to who is protected 
by tribe immunity. 
The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez112 contended with the 
breadth of tribal immunity when a female member of the Pueblo tribe and 
her daughter sued the Tribe and the tribal Governor, Lucario Padilla, for 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment.113 Before reaching the merits, the 
Court had to address the issue of whether the defendants, both the Tribe 
and the Governor, were immune from suit. First, the Court noted tribes 
had historically not been bound by the constitutional constraints that 
limited federal or state power because they predated the Constitution.114 
Congress, through its plenary authority to limit the tribes’ self-
governance, had enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),115 which 
incorporated numerous constitutional protections verbatim as applicable 
to the tribes.116 Yet, ICRA did not expressly waive tribal immunity to 
private suit and therefore the Tribe was beyond the reach of the 
plaintiffs.117 
                                                     
108. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (holding 
that tribal immunity prevents a state from suing a tribe over off-reservation gambling activities); Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (holding that tribal immunity prevents a private 
individual from suing a tribe for violations of ICRA). 
109. See, e.g., Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2017) (examining whether an 
employee of a tribe being sued for negligence was protected by the tribe’s immunity). 
110. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 (“Although no longer possessed of the full attributes of 
sovereignty, [tribes] remain a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
111. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,826, 26,826 (May 4, 2016). 
112. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  
113. Id. at 49. 
114. Id. at 56.  
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2018). 
116. Id. 
117. The Court did note that ICRA expressly allowed private individuals to file habeas petitions in 
federal court, but distinguished these proceedings as being against an individual custodian rather than 
a tribe. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49. 
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Having shown the plaintiffs’ suit against one of the defendants was 
barred, the Court turned to the question of whether the plaintiffs’ suit 
against the Pueblo’s Governor could proceed.118 The Court held “as an 
officer of the Pueblo, [the Governor was] not protected by the tribe’s 
immunity from suit.”119 The Court cited two of its own cases to support 
this proposition. First, it looked to Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of 
Game of State of Washington,120 which held tribal immunity “does not 
immunize the individual members of the Tribe” from suit in a state court 
of competent jurisdiction.121 In Puyallup, the “individual members” were 
fishermen acting in their private capacities.122 The Court then cited Ex 
Parte Young,123 which held that when the State acts unconstitutionally, 
suits for equitable relief against officials acting on behalf of a State may 
proceed.124 
Recent litigation revealed another dimension of tribal immunity: 
whether tribal immunity extends to property owned by a tribe. In 2013, 
Washington State’s Upper Skagit Indian Tribe purchased a parcel of 
land.125 The Tribe surveyed the land in preparation for the federal 
government to take the land into trust.126 The Tribe discovered the owners 
of the neighboring parcel, the Lundgrens, had a fence extending over the 
official boundary of the land described in the Tribe’s deed.127 The 
Lundgrens filed a quiet title action claiming they had acquired the 
disputed property by adverse possession.128 The suit was an in rem action. 
Nevertheless, the Tribe moved to dismiss the suit claiming it was an 
                                                     
118. Id. at 59. 
119. Id. (finding that ICRA did not create any private right of action other than habeas petitions, 
even though the Governor may not have been protected by immunity; therefore, the suit against the 
Governor could not proceed). 
120. 433 U.S. at 172 (1976). 
121. Id. 
122. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59. 
123. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
124. Id. at 168 (at bottom this is still a constitutional claim under the Supremacy Clause). 
125. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (Upper Skagit Indian Tribe I), No. 91622-5, slip op. 
at 3 (Wash. Feb. 16, 2017). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 2. 
128. Id. at 3. 
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“indispensable party”129 in the action and, because the court could not join 
the Tribe without its consent, the action could not proceed.130 
To determine whether the Tribe was a necessary party, the Washington 
State Supreme Court considered whether the Tribe actually had an interest 
in the land stating, “[w]here no interest exists, nonjoinder presents no 
jurisdictional barriers.”131 Essentially the Court was asking: who owns the 
property? The Court recognized this analysis seems to put “the cart before 
the horse,” yet found it essential to determine whether the Tribe needed to 
be joined.132 The Court held the Lundgrens had acquired the land by 
adverse possession long before the Tribe bought the parcel. Therefore, 
according to the Court, the Tribe’s interest in the land was unfounded and 
the quiet title action did not require the Tribe to be joined.133 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Washington State 
Supreme Court.134 The Court found the case relied on by the Washington 
State Supreme Court, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Nation,135 dealt only with in rem taxation of fee-patented 
land within the reservation under section 6 of the General Allotment 
Act.136 Yakima, according to the Court, did not restrict or expand the 
doctrine of tribal immunity.137 However, the Court noted that an argument 
raised by the respondents at oral argument may meritoriously defeat the 
                                                     
129. Superior Court Civil Rule (CR) 19 mirrors that of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and 
states:  
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be 
joined as a party in the action if . . . (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may (A) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest . . . . 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person joinable under (1) or (2) 
of section (a) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and 
good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, 
the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court 
include: (l) to what extent a judgment rendered in the persons absence might be prejudicial to 
the person or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the 
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; 
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; (4) whether the 
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
SUP. CT. CIV. R. 19; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
130. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe I, slip op. at 3–4. 
131. Id. at 13. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 13–14. 
134. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren (Upper Skagit Indian Tribe II), No. 17–387, slip op. 
(U.S. May 21, 2018). 
135. Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
136. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe II, slip op. at 3.  
137. Id.  
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Tribe’s claim of sovereign immunity.138 The respondent suggested that 
where a tribe buys land within a state as a private party would, then 
sovereign immunity does not attach to the property.139 Instead, the state 
retains the right to settle disputes related to the title and ownership of 
“immovable property within the state.”140 The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe 
alongside the federal government argued while the “immovable property” 
exception might be applicable to state sovereign immunity or sovereign 
immunity to foreign princes, it does not automatically extend to tribes.141 
Rather, whether tribal immunity is subject to the “immovable property” 
exception is a question best left to the “political branches rather than 
judges.”142 
2. When is Tribal Immunity Waived? 
A tribe may be sued only if the tribe consents to suit or if Congress 
abrogates its immunity.143 Generally, a tribe’s sovereign immunity is only 
waived by the tribe if the waiver is “clear.”144 A common form of express 
waiver of immunity is a contract. For example, an express waiver may be 
as clear as “the tribe waiv[ing] sovereign immunity over all disputes 
arising under this agreement” or submitting claims to the jurisdiction of a 
particular court or tribunal.145 
                                                     
138. Id. at 5–6. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (citing Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145 (1812)) (“A prince, 
by acquiring private property in a foreign country . . . may be considered as so far laying down the 
prince, and assuming the character of a private individual.”). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 6. In his dissent in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe II, Justice Thomas identified the roots of 
the “immovable property” exception: the common law principle lex rei sitae (“land is governed by 
the law of the place where it is situated”). Id. at 5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting F. WHARTON, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273, at 607 (G. Parmele ed., 3d ed. 1905)). This principle evolved as a method 
to protect encroachment into one sovereign’s territory by another. “[B]ecause ‘land is so indissolubly 
connected with the territory of a State,’ a State ‘cannot permit’ a foreign sovereign to displace its 
jurisdiction by purchasing land and then claiming ‘immunity.’” Id. (quoting Competence of Courts in 
Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 451, 578 (1932)). 
143. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 752 (1998). 
144. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2035 (2014) (“[A] 
party dealing with a tribe in contract negotiations has the power to protect itself by refusing to deal 
absent the tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.” (quoting Brief for Michigan at 40, Bay 
Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). 
145. See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 415 
(2001). 
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Courts often reject arguments that tribal conduct constitutes an implied 
waiver of sovereign immunity.146 Nor have courts construed a tribe’s 
participation in litigation to be a waiver.147 Even when the tribe initiates 
litigation against a party, it “does not waive its sovereign immunity from 
actions that could not otherwise be brought against it merely because 
those actions were pleaded in a counterclaim to an action filed by the 
tribe.”148 However, as a narrow exception, if a counterclaim is defensive, 
such as one for recoupment or set-off of claims, the court may allow it to 
proceed.149 
Beyond the recoupment exception to tribes’ immunity from 
counterclaims, lower courts have explored the outer limits of the implied 
waiver doctrine. Courts have attempted to articulate the boundaries of 
implied waiver of tribal immunity. It is clear that, by instituting an action 
as a plaintiff, a tribe submits itself to adverse judgment.150 Further, when 
it requests the court to compel counterclaims, it implicitly waives its 
immunity over those claims.151 Moreover, a court, approaching the outer 
bounds of implicit waiver doctrine, found a tribe intervening in a suit in 
equity waives immunity over later actions requesting modification of the 
court’s order.152 
But most critically for SRMT, when a tribe initiates a suit over a 
particular piece of property, it does not waive immunity for any 
subsequent actions concerning the same property.153 In Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe v. Hodel,154 the Jicarilla Tribe sued to cancel certain oil and gas 
leases on reservation lands awarded by the Department of the Interior 
because the leases were undervalued.155 Dome Petroleum was one such 
                                                     
146. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760 (holding off-reservation commercial transaction 
between a tribe and a non-Indian company was not a waiver of tribal immunity). “Tribes enjoy 
immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial 
activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has not abrogated this 
immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity governs this case.” Id. 
147. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 509 (1991). 
148. Id.; Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson for Estate of Comenout, 868 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“On this point, ‘Supreme Court precedent couldn’t be clearer . . . : a tribe’s decision to go to 
court doesn’t automatically open it up to counterclaims—even compulsory ones.’”). 
149. See United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (2017). 
150. Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing F. COHEN, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 324 (1982)). 
151. Id. 
152. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981). 
153. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1987). 
154. 821 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1987). 
155. Id. at 538. 
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leaseholder and filed an independent action to preserve its leasehold by 
paying the difference in fair value of the lease.156 Dome’s independent suit 
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the Tribe due to its 
immunity.157 On appeal, Dome claimed the Tribe had implicitly waived 
its immunity in disputes regarding the leaseholds when it filed its original 
action. The court rejected this argument, stating, “[a]lthough the Tribe’s 
filing of the Jicarilla litigation may have waived its immunity with regard 
to Dome’s intervention in that suit, we cannot construe the act of filing 
that suit as a sufficiently unequivocal expression of waiver in subsequent 
actions relating to the same leases.”158 Further, waiver of immunity in 
Dome’s independent action “was not one of the terms of the Tribe’s initial 
suit; it therefore cannot be made a party to [Dome’s] subsequent 
litigation.”159 
A recent determination by PTAB on whether Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity protects state-owned patents from IPR muddies the 
waters of implicit waiver doctrine. In Ericsson v. Regents of the University 
of Minnesota,160 an IPR proceeding initiated against several patents 
owned by the University of Minnesota, a PTAB court found that, while 
state-owned patents are ordinarily immune from IPR, the State “waived 
its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing an action in federal court 
alleging infringement of the patent being challenged in this 
proceeding.”161 
While there was no express, specific waiver of sovereign immunity, the 
PTAB found the University of Minnesota implicitly waived its 
immunity.162 Prior to the IPR proceedings, the University of Minnesota 
filed a patent infringement suit in federal court concerning the same 
patents at issue in the IPR complaint.163 The PTAB looked to cases 
remarking there is no “bright-line rule whereby a State’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity can never extend to a . . . separate lawsuit.”164 In 
                                                     
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 539. 
159. Id. at 540. 
160. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563 (P.T.A.B. 
Dec. 19, 2017). 
161. Id. at *4. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at *7. 
164. Id. (citing Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
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Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia,165 the Court 
explained the rule governing waiver of immunity by litigation conduct 
rests on the need to avoid “unfairness” and “inconsistency,” as well as to 
prevent a state from selectively using immunity to achieve a litigation 
advantage.166 In a state’s patent infringement suit, the defendant “must 
request an inter partes review of the asserted patent within one year of 
service of that complaint or be forever barred from doing so.”167 
Therefore, the PTAB reasoned, the State had notice of the compulsory-
counterclaim-like nature of the IPR proceedings following its 
infringement suit.168 Further, to bar the IPR petitioner from initiating the 
proceedings would be unfair.169 So far, no court has extended the PTAB’s 
reasoning regarding waivers of state immunity to waivers of tribal 
immunity. 
Absent tribal consent to suit, Congress may also use its plenary power 
over the tribes to waive tribal immunity. While Congress’s power over the 
scope of tribal immunity is broad, Congress’s use of its power must be 
express.170 The Court held abrogation of tribal immunity cannot be 
implied from a statute, but must be “unequivocally expressed.”171 “Thus, 
unless and ‘until Congress acts, the tribes retain’ their historic sovereign 
authority.”172 The Court stated that when ambiguity exists in a statute 
alleged to waive sovereign immunity, a court must resolve any 
ambiguities in favor of the tribes.173 In this way, tribal immunity shares a 
crucial presumption of existence absent express abrogation with other 
sovereign entities such as foreign governments, States, and the federal 
                                                     
165. 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
166. Id. at 614. But see Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 
1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a state university’s suit in Texas against cellular telephone 
companies for patent infringement did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity to a 
contemporaneous private action for declaratory judgment in Washington that patent was invalid; 
although the university had made itself a party to its litigation to the full extent required for its 
complete determination, it did not thereby voluntarily submit itself “to a new action brought by a 
different party in a different state and a different district court”). 
167. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *8 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2018)). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 
U.S. 392, 399 (1976)) (“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must 
be unequivocally expressed.’”). 
171. Id.  
172. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014). 
173. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976). 
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government itself.174 Nevertheless, while requiring Congress to use 
express terms of abrogation, the Court left Congress’s legislative 
prerogative concerning tribal immunity undisturbed. The Court 
recognized “[i]t is fundamentally Congress’s job, not [the Court’s], to 
determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity. The special brand of 
sovereignty tribes retain—both its nature and its extent—rests in the hands 
of Congress.”175 
3. To What Forums Does Sovereign Immunity Apply? 
The Court has not addressed whether tribal immunity extends to 
administrative as well as judicial proceedings. In Federal Maritime 
Commission (FMC) v. South Carolina State Port Authority,176 the Court 
held the sovereign immunity afforded to states applies to some 
adjudicative administrative proceedings. In FMC, a private cruise ship 
company filed a maritime services complaint against the South Carolina 
State Port Authority (SCSPA) with the Federal Maritime Commission 
(FMC).177 SCSPA filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint 
claiming that, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, it was entitled to 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity.”178 
The FMC argued the Eleventh Amendment only extended to exercises 
of “judicial power,” and the FMC’s administrative proceeding were not 
“judicial” or a “suit in law or equity” within the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment.179 The Court found even if it accepted this textual argument, 
“sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text 
of the Eleventh Amendment.”180 The Court considered the features of the 
administrative proceeding to determine whether it was “the type . . . from 
which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity 
when they agreed to enter the Union.”181 From their inquiry, they found 
an administrative proceeding “walks, talks, and squawks very much like 
                                                     
174. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); see also The Schooner Exch. 
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 125 (1812) (“the law of nations excludes the implication and 
presumption in every case where the sovereignty is concerned . . . [is of] the sovereign himself”). 
175. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2037. 
176. 535 U.S. 743, 753–61 (2002). 
177. Id. at 747. 
178. Id. at 749.  
179. Id. at 753. 
180. Id. at 754.  
181. Id. at 756. 
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a lawsuit.”182 Its rules for pleadings, discovery, claims, and default 
mirrored the federal rules of civil procedure.183 Further, the roles and 
deference afforded to the administrative judge were similar to an 
Article III judge.184 
In addition to the procedural similarity between civil litigation and the 
administrative adjudication at issue, the Court also looked to the purpose 
of state immunity “to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their 
status as sovereign entities.”185 It found “[p]rivate suits against 
nonconsenting States . . . present ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the 
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties,’ 
regardless of the forum.”186 Furthermore, it would be inconsistent to 
prevent Congress from abrogating state sovereignty in an Article III court 
only to allow the same proceeding to take place in an administrative 
court.187 
While the Court has not addressed whether IPR proceedings against 
States are specifically barred by sovereign immunity, PTAB has upheld 
state immunity in IPR proceedings.188 When it came to States, PTAB was 
“not persuaded . . . that the differences in pleadings, discovery, relief, 
standards, and jurisdictional and standing requirements effectively 
distinguish inter partes reviews from civil litigation for the purposes of 
applying sovereign immunity.”189 
Yet, when deciding whether the same reasoning applied to IPR 
proceedings instituted against tribally-owned patents, PTAB found 
SRMT failed to establish it was entitled to assert its tribal immunity with 
respect to the patents assigned to it by Allergan. PTAB made several 
arguments on which it based its holding which can be distilled into four 
lines of reasoning. First, the PTAB found the statutes regulating patents 
were “generally applicable” and applied to tribes and therefore tribes were 
subject to IPR proceedings.190 Second, the PTAB argued “tribal immunity 
                                                     
182. Id. at 757 (quoting S.C. State Port Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 
2001)). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 758. 
185. Id. at 744. 
186. Id. at 760 (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). 
187. Id. 
188. See, e.g., Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fl. Research Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 
4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
189. Id. at *19. 
190. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2017-00576, 2018 WL 1100950, at *11 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018), aff’d, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 18-1638 (Fed. 
Cir. July 20, 2018). 
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is generally not asserted in administrative proceedings because tribes 
cannot impose sovereign immunity to bar the federal government from 
exercising its trust obligations.”191 Third, the PTAB held an IPR 
proceeding is not the type of “suit” to which an Indian tribe would 
traditionally enjoy immunity under the common law because the 
petitioner will not receive any relief from the tribe.192 Lastly, PTAB 
claimed it did not exercise in personam jurisdiction over patent owners, 
but rather exercised jurisdiction over the patent itself.193 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed PTAB’s finding 
that tribal immunity did not bar IPR proceedings against SMRT’s 
patents.194 The court reasoned that IPR was “more like an agency 
enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party,” therefore, 
the FMC exception did not apply.195 The court identified several 
characteristics that distinguished IPR from civil litigation. First, the court 
reasoned that in IPR the Director “possesses broad discretion in deciding 
whether to institute review” whereas in FMC-like cases, the agency has 
no discretion to refuse to adjudicate complaints brought by private 
parties.196 Second, in IPR, unlike civil litigation, the PTAB may continue 
to review a patent even when the private complainant chooses to no longer 
participate in the process.197 Third, the court found that “the USPTO 
procedures in IPR do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 
Given these differences, the Federal Circuit held that SRMT’s patents 
were not immune from IPR.198 
C. Congress’s Choices Regarding Tribal Sovereignty 
In recent years, Congress has entertained an numerous bids to abrogate 
tribal immunity, limit tribes’ powers of self-governance, and regulate 
tribes’ internal and external commercial dealings.199 While the Allergan-
Mohawk agreement represents one recent way in which tribal immunity 
is commercialized, in the past Congress has kept the bounds of tribal 
                                                     
191. Id. at *13–14 (quoting Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
192. Id. at *16. 
193. Id. at *16–17. 
194. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 18-1638 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 20, 2018). 
195. Id. slip op. at 8. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. slip op. at 9. 
198. Id. slip op. at 9–12. 
199. DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 78–81 (3d ed. 2002). 
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immunity broad in order to recognize the sovereign character of tribes and 
encourage commercial activity.200 Overall, past courts have noted 
Congress’s regular approval of the tribal immunity doctrine “in order to 
promote Indian self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic 
development.”201 This section examines Congress’s use of tribal 
sovereignty to determine whether there is in fact a cognizable policy of 
using tribal immunity as a method of fostering tribal economic 
development. 
Under the current benefits conferred by Congress, a commercial 
venture with an Indian tribe can offer many advantages to non-tribal 
partners. In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act.202 Ever since, in the interest of fostering tribal 
economic development and independence, Congress “increasingly 
authorized Indian tribes to manage Federal programs and assume control 
over their own affairs.”203 Under this general congressional policy of 
allowing tribes a greater measure of self-governance, tribal governments 
enjoy numerous privileges that make them unique, and potentially 
profitable, business partners. 
For instance, many tribal governments have exercised the privilege to 
charter and maintain corporate affiliates. These tribal corporations are 
often formed under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act.204 
Additionally, some tribally owned for-profit corporations are chartered 
under the laws of the tribe rather than section 17.205 Section 17 
corporations often enjoy the same sovereign immunity as the tribe 
itself.206 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “the language of Section 17 itself—
                                                     
200. STAFF OF SUBCOM. ON ECON. IN GOV’T, JOINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., TOWARD 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE COMMUNITIES COMMITTEE REPORT (Joint Comm. Print 
1969). 
201. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 505–06 
(1991).  
202. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 
(1975) (codified at amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 
(2018)); Obstacles and Impediments to Expansion of Self-Governance, Oversight Hearing on Tribal 
Self-Governance Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Oversight 
Hearing on Tribal Self-Governance]. 
203. Oversight Hearing on Tribal Self-Governance, at 1; S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 3 (1987) (noting 
“[t]he present right of Indian tribes to govern their members and territories flows from a preexisting 
sovereignty limited, but not abolished, by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United 
States”).  
204. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2018); KAREN J. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN M. NILLES, IRS, TRIBAL 
BUSINESS STRUCTURE HANDBOOK (2008). 
205. ATKINSON & NILLES, supra note 204. 
206. COHEN, supra note 43, at 645. 
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by calling the entity an ‘incorporated tribe’—suggests that the entity is an 
arm of the tribe.”207 Some courts have found business entities formed 
under the tribes’ own laws also enjoy immunity.208 Therefore, investment 
in the projects of a tribal corporation may mitigate some of the risk found 
in other corporate ventures such as legal liability for private claims (e.g., 
contract, common tort, and products liability claims). 
Aside from the commercial benefits of immune tribal corporations, 
tribal land is exempt from numerous regulatory requirements that can be 
costly and burdensome to potential developers.209 Reservation lands are 
generally exempt from local, county, and state zoning and land-use 
restrictions and state permitting requirements.210 For non-tribal investors 
interested in building, tribes can issue environmental licenses and permits 
in conformance with tribal law and certain provisions of federal 
Environmental Protection Agency requirements.211 Partnering with a 
tribal entity can be invaluable to investors seeking to build on tribal land. 
To relieve some of the economic distress common among tribal 
communities, Congress incentivized investment in tribes.212 Among the 
                                                     
207. Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., 585 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2009). 
208. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989 (1995). 
209. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1973) (“State laws 
generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has 
expressly provided that State laws shall apply.”) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 845 (1958)); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings Cty., 532 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(“Congress assumed and intended that states had no power to regulate the Indian use or governance 
of the reservation . . . .”). 
210. Gobin v. Snohomish Cty., 304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Indian tribe has 
exclusive land use jurisdiction over fee lands owned by tribal members on an Indian reservation 
except in exceptional circumstances). 
211. Congress has acted under several federal environmental statutes to authorize the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to delegate to Indian tribes specific enforcement and 
regulatory authority to the same or a similar degree as is delegated by the EPA to the states. Because 
a growing number of tribes are seeking such delegation, activities on Native American lands may be 
governed by tribal programs that have the backing of federal law. Potentially applicable federal 
environmental protection laws include the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and other statutes. See 
generally Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision – Final Interpretive Rule (820-
F-16-005): Frequently Asked Questions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
05/documents/faqs_cwa_tas_ir_4-20-16_508c.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK4X-ETFW]. 
212. See Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at amended in 
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.) (Congress instituted a loan guaranty program in which 
a loan from a lender to a Tribe or an Alaska Native group may be provided a guaranty of up to 90% 
of the loan if the business activity will contribute to reservation economic development. The business 
must be located on or near an Indian reservation and must contribute to the economy of the 
reservation. The tribe must have at least 20% equity in the business. The loans may be used for a 
variety of purposes including operating capital, equipment purchases, business refinance, building 
construction, and lines of credit.). 
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most powerful are tribes’ exemption from state and federal taxation.213 
Congress also created positive tax credits to entice commercial investment 
in the tribes. So-called “New Markets Tax Credits” incentivize investors 
to make capital investments on reservations.214 Congress has also 
permitted businesses to deduct higher depreciation rates for on-
reservation equipment and buildings.215 Non-tribal employers can receive 
a tax credit of up to 20% of wages and health insurance for employees 
residing on reservations to encourage employment of Indians and increase 
wages for tribal members.216 Additionally, a variety of federal contracting 
preferences and loan guarantees benefit tribal corporations, and indirectly, 
the investors in tribal corporations.217 
Congress has leveraged the unique character of tribes to promote tribal 
economic development by maintaining tribal sovereignty from private 
liability, exempting tribes from numerous tax and zoning regimes, giving 
tribes greater autonomy in administering environmental regulations, and 
creating positive tax benefits for tribal investment. 
II. INTER PARTES REVIEW 
This section explores IPR for patents. First, it describes in broad strokes 
the nature of the patent challenge process. Second, it discusses the 
operation of and purpose for IPR. The Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”218 One of 
the ways Congress exercises its power to regulate intellectual property is 
to grant patents, which confer “the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
                                                     
213. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL TAX 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES AND THEIR MEMBERS 2 (Comm. Print. 2008). 
214. The tax credit may be up to 39% of the total on-reservation investment and is spread over 
seven years, five percent of the investment for the first three years, and six percent of the investment 
amount can be claimed the next four years. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-605. 
215. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13321(a), 107 Stat. 312, 558.  
216. 26 U.S.C § 45A (2018). 
217. See 25 U.S.C. § 47 (2018) (authorizing the BIA to give preference to Indian and tribally-
owned companies in its procurement contracts); Contracting, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/ogc_and_bd/resources/11498 [https://perma.cc/7GY9-
XWQQ] (“Tribal and [Alaska Native Corporation] 8(a) firms are eligible to receive sole source 8(a) 
contracts regardless of dollar size, with no upper limit, while all other 8(a) firms may not receive sole 
source contracts in excess of $3 million for services and $5 million for manufacturing.”).  
218. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
15 - Brickey.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:53 PM 
2018] USING TRIBAL IMMUNITY TO SHIELD PATENTS 1475 
 
States.”219 Since 1836, Congress has vested the USPTO with the power to 
examine and grant patents.220 The standards for patentability require the 
invention to satisfy conditions including eligibility and utility221; 
novelty222; and non-obviousness over the prior art.223 In 2015, the USPTO 
received 629,647 patent applications and granted 325,979 patents.224 
Each patent requires the PTO to examine the “prior art” and determine 
whether the claimed invention is novel enough to warrant a patent.225 
Because a thorough examination of the prior art of each patent is a labor-
intensive process, and the PTO is bound by strict resource limitations, 
there have been historical concerns that some patents are granted in 
error.226 To address the possibility that patents are granted in error, 
Congress in 1980 created an ex parte reexamination process with the goal 
of restoring public and commercial “confidence in the validity of patents 
issued by the PTO”227 The ex parte reexamination proceedings could be 
requested by any person.228 If the PTO finds the petition raises “a 
substantial new question of patentability” it may institute ex parte 
proceedings.229 During the proceedings, neither the petitioner or the 
patent-holder are entitled to present claims before the PTO.230 Congress, 
nearly two decades later, created an inter partes reexamination process.231 
While similar to the ex parte process, the inter partes reexamination 
                                                     
219. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018). 
220. Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed in 1952). This act created an 
Official Patent office and authorized the patent office to examine patent application to ensure that the 
inventions were indeed original. 
221. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
222. Id. § 102. 
223. Id. § 103. 
224. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 - 2015, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/SZ4G-
XPMS]. 
225. See 35 U.S.C. § 131; 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2012). 
226. See John A. Jeffery, Preserving the Presumption of Patent Validity: An Alternative to 
Outsourcing the U.S. Patent Examiner’s Prior Art Search, 53 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 761, 763 n.9 
(2003).  
227. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds 
on reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
228. 35 U.S.C. § 302. The AIA amended the ex parte reexamination procedure to allow the Director 
to institute a reexamination on the Director’s own initiative if a substantial new question of 
patentability is raised by patents or publications. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45 (2011). 
229. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 304. 
230. Id. §§ 303(a), 305. 
231. Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601–
4608, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-567 (repealed 2011). This process is distinct from inter partes review.  
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allows petitioners to participate in the proceedings and respond to the 
patent-holder’s arguments of validity.232 
In 2011, Congress created IPR through the American Invents Act 
(AIA).233 The act created a new body within the PTO, the PTAB to hear 
the IPR. The AIA’s creation of IPR responded to the “growing sense” that 
under existing procedures, “questionable patents [were] too easily 
obtained and [were] too difficult to challenge.”234 So far the IPR process 
has been invoked in over 32,000 patent claims and invalidated nearly 
17,000 patents through a final PTAB decision.235 The IPR proceedings at 
issue in Allergan-Mohawk-like agreements are held before the PTAB, an 
administrative court under the AIA.236 The AIA expands the role of IPR 
in determining the validity of patents and creates an adversarial process 
of patent reexamination between two private parties.237 This Part 
examines the mechanics of the administrative process of IPR and the 
congressional intent behind IPR. 
A. Operation and Legislative Purpose 
According to Congress, it intended the AIA to “establish a more 
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality 
and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”238 Thus, 
there were three distinct, identifiable goals of the AIA: (1) increase 
procedural efficiency, (2) decrease costs, and (3) increase the “quality” of 
patents. It is important to discuss whether IPR proceedings align with the 
aforementioned congressional purposes to inform the later discussion of 
whether an agreement to circumvent IPR is actually contrary to public 
policy as some critics claim. 
1. Streamlined Procedure 
To increase efficiency, the AIA converted “inter partes reexamination 
from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding, and rename[d] the 
                                                     
232. 35 U.S.C. § 316, 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2016). 
233. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
at amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
234. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 (2011). 
235. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 12 (2017) 
(data current as of Mar. 31, 2017). 
236. 37 C.F.R. § 42 (2018). 
237. Id. (emphasis added). 
238. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
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proceeding ‘inter partes review.’”239 IPR is only one of several ways third 
parties can challenge the validity of patents before PTAB. Unlike post-
grant reviews (PGRs), which may be instituted by a third party up to nine 
months after the PTO grants a patent, IPR may be instituted at any time 
between the nine month post-grant period and the patent’s twenty-year 
expiration date.240 As with inter partes reexamination, any person other 
than the patent owner may seek IPR on the belief the invention was not 
novel or was obvious in light of “prior art consisting of patents or printed 
publications” when it was patented.241 After receiving any response from 
the patent owner, the Director of the USPTO may institute an IPR if he 
finds “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail” with 
respect to at least one of its challenges to the validity of a patent.242 
If the petitioner previously filed a civil action challenging the validity 
of the disputed patent, or if the patent owner sued the petitioner for 
infringement of the disputed patent more than one year before the petition 
was filed, IPR proceedings cannot be initiated.243 The AIA gave third-
party challengers “broader participation rights” in IPR than they had 
possessed in inter partes reexamination.244 Both the patent owner and the 
third-party challenger are entitled to certain discovery,245 to file affidavits, 
declarations, and written memoranda,246 and to request an oral hearing.247 
Further, the AIA rejected the presumption of validity that applies to 
patents in civil litigation. To claim a patent was invalid under 
35 U.S.C. § 282 before a District Court, a claimant had to “persuade the 
factfinder of [the patent’s] in-validity defense by clear and convincing 
evidence.”248 The standard of proof applied to patent challenges in IPR 
proceedings is the far less exacting “preponderance of the evidence.”249 
PTAB must issue a final written decision on patentability within one year 
after the decision to institute IPR, unless the deadline is extended or the 
                                                     
239. Id. at 46–47. 
240. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2018). 
241. Id. § 311(a), (b). 
242. Id. § 314(a). 
243. Id. § 315(a)–(b). 
244. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016). 
245. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5). 
246. Id. § 316(a)(8). 
247. Id. § 316(a)(10). 
248. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 91 (2011). 
249. 35 U.S.C. § 316. 
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PTAB dismisses review.250 The Federal Circuit may review PTAB’s 
decision on appeal.251 
2. Decreased Costs 
Aligned with Congress’s goal of creating a more expeditious and less 
costly forum, IPR is significantly cheaper than federal litigation. Costs of 
federal patent litigation can easily rise into the millions.252 Under the 
PTO’s regulations, the base IPR fee is $23,000.253 Additionally, the PTO 
requires the petitioner to pay nominal fees for each additional claim raised 
during the various stages of the proceedings.254 If the PTAB, finding no 
significant question of validity, declines the petition for IPR, the PTO will 
issue a refund of $14,000 to the petitioner.255 Furthermore, because the 
IPR process is designed to be quicker and is on a strict timetable, parties 
will tend to owe less in attorney’s fees than they would have in federal 
court.256 In total, IPR usually costs approximately $300,000 per side 
compared to millions in patent litigation.257 Congress therefore achieved 
its goal of creating a less prohibitively expensive forum to root out invalid 
patents. 
3. Increasing the “Quality” of Patents 
The mere number of patents invalidated by PTAB does not necessarily 
demonstrate increased patent quality. For instance, if a valid patent is 
erroneously invalidated, the ruling undermines patent quality.258 
                                                     
250. Id. § 316(a)(11). 
251. See id. §§ 141, 319. 
252. See Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, BNA (Aug. 10, 
2017), https://www.bna.com/cost-patent-infringement-n73014463011/ [https://perma.cc/C2J5-
B33H] (reporting that the cost of an average patent infringement lawsuit, where $1 million to 
$10 million is at risk, was $1.7 million in 2017).  
253. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a)(1)–(2) (2017).  
254. Id. § 42.15(a)(3)–(4). 
255. Id. § 42.15(a)(2). 
256. Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent 
Reviews 12 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Stud. Research Paper, Paper No. 10-15, 2015) (forthcoming 
STAN. TECH. L. REV.) (arguing that patent invalidation is a public good and that post-grant reviews, 
such as IPRs, can reduce uncertainty over the boundaries and validity of granted patents). 
257. Id. 
258. See Quality Metrics, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/quality-metrics-1#step1 [https://perma.cc/5GCE-HJHQ] 
(“[The USPTO] consider[s] a quality patent to be one that is correctly issued in compliance with all 
the requirements of Title 35 as well as the relevant case law at the time of issuance.”); see generally 
Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2014). 
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Therefore, rather than looking at the raw number of invalidations, it is 
helpful to examine how PTAB determinations are treated on appeal to the 
Federal Circuit. In 2016, 3% of PTAB’s rulings were reversed on 
appeal.259 This number rose to 5% in 2017.260 However, the low number 
of reversals and the high number of affirmances on the merits (85% and 
67% of cases in 2016 and 2017, respectively) demonstrates the Federal 
Circuit’s confidence in PTAB findings.261 
Through IPR, Congress created a more efficient, less costly forum for 
patent actions than federal court. IPR demonstrated a degree of reliability 
in making correct determinations about the status of patents. IPR closely 
serves the purposes identified by Congress when it enacted the AIA’s 
patent-reform regime. Critics of the Allergan agreement could correctly 
claim it undercuts public policy as identified by Congress. If enforced, the 
agreement would shield tribally owned patents from this efficient, 
economical, and often-correct forum. Enforcement would thereby restrict 
challenges to tribally held patents to being brought in federal court as a 
defense to a patent infringement claim or in non-adversarial patent review 
proceedings. Nevertheless, Congress in the AIA did not discuss, 
implicate, or waive tribal immunity. Therefore, if there is an argument that 
the Allergan-Mohawk agreement is ineffective, it is not found in the text 
of the statute. 
III. SHAM AGREEMENTS 
One of the criticisms of the Allergan-Mohawk agreement is that it was 
a “sham” transaction.262 The opponents to the agreement’s validity urged 
the court to “look[ ] behind the face of the transactions to determine 
whether the transactions have economic substance,” and compared the 
agreement to “a method of gaming the tax system to generate 
benefits . . . not intended to be available.”263 While the judge did not rule 
on whether the agreement was invalid based on the concerns implicated 
above, he professed “serious doubts” the agreement “is the kind of 
transaction to which the Tribe’s sovereign immunity was meant to 
                                                     
259. Kerry Taylor et al., IPR Appeals in 2017: The Pendency and Success Rates, LAW360 (Jan. 16, 
2018, 1:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1000442/ipr-appeals-in-2017-the-pendency-and-
success-rates [https://perma.cc/2AZL-ND3Z]. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
263. Id. at 5. 
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extend.”264 This section briefly examines whether the trial court’s 
concerns were well founded in transactional law. The central question is: 
what constitutes a “sham” agreement? 
Because New York law governs the Allergan-Mohawk agreement,265 
New York’s characterization of “sham” agreements is particularly 
relevant. New York law on sham contracts parallels federal law on the 
subject.266 On this question, courts are typically called on to determine 
whether the agreements reported by the defendants were valid and 
effectively entitled the defendant to the tax benefits they claimed.267 
For example, in In re Bernard S. Hodes,268 New York’s Division of Tax 
Appeals examined whether the reported expenses and transactions of a 
horse breeder were merely shams meant to escape tax liability.269 There 
the court stated that, under New York case law, “a sham transaction is one 
that never really took place” or “there was nothing of substance to be 
realized . . . from [the] transaction beyond a tax deduction.”270 New 
York’s so-called “economic substance” test mirrors federal case law on 
“shams.”271 
In the tax context, when judging whether an agreement lacks 
“economic substance” and is therefore a “sham,” the court engages in a 
two-part inquiry. First, the court considers whether the agreement is 
profitable absent the tax benefit.272 If not, the court examines whether the 
transaction meaningfully alters the parties’ economic positions—absent 
the tax consequences—and whether the transaction has a “bona fide 
business purpose.”273 Even if the answer to both forgoing questions is 
“no,” the court may not brand the transaction a sham if the parties prove 
the purpose of the transaction was not to “game the system” but was 
                                                     
264. Id. at 6. 
265. Allergan, Response to Defendants’ Notice, supra note 26, at Exhibit A. 
266. Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
267. See, e.g., In re Bernard S. Hodes, Nos. 807328 and 808528, 1993 WL 498231 at *18 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App. Ct. Nov. 24, 1993) (examining whether business deductions claimed by the petitioner 
were correctly disallowed as “sham” transactions). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. The presence of tax-avoidance motives does not necessarily make a sham if the transaction 
has real economic effect. See Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (“To 
treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business 
purpose other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no 
economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists.” (emphasis added)). 
271. Salem Fin., Inc., 786 F.3d at 946. 
272. Id. at 950. 
273. Id. 
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aligned with a broader policy goal.274 For instance, in some cases 
Congress may incentivize companies to conduct business through targeted 
tax breaks.275 If a transaction was declared a “sham” merely for taking 
advantage of those incentives, it “would be contrary to the clear intent of 
Congress.”276 
It is unclear whether the definition of “sham” in the context of tax law 
can be fairly analogized to other types of agreements and government 
programs. More specifically, it is not clear whether an agreement solely 
intended to circumvent the patent review system follows the same 
“profitability” considerations as those intended to avoid tax liability. 
IV. THE ALLERGAN-MOHAWK AGREEMENT: SHREWD OR 
SHAM? 
In light of the unique character of Indian tribes, the Allergan-Mohawk 
Agreement is a lawful and effective measure for avoiding IPR. Tribes are 
generally immune from suit in federal court.277 Absent congressional or 
tribal waiver, this immunity should extend to most administrative 
adjudications as well. Congress did not expressly abrogate tribal 
sovereignty in the AIA or any other statute governing patents, nor did the 
tribe waive its immunity by participating in the patent process.278 Further, 
the agreements between SRMT and Allergan were supported by valid 
consideration and actual performance.279 Therefore, tribally held patents 
are immune from IPR. This Part argues each of the preceding points. 
A. SRMT Is Generally Immune from Privately-Initiated Actions in  
Administrative Proceedings like IPR. 
The PTAB and the Federal Circuit incorrectly found tribal immunity 
does not extend to IPR proceedings. The PTAB held and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed that tribal immunity is not implicated by IPR because 
                                                     
274. Id. at 942. 
275. See Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 990–92 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the taxpayer’s claim 
for regular investment credit and a business energy investment credit—where the taxpayer entered 
into a sale-leaseback transaction for solar water heaters—against the IRS’s claim that the transaction 
as a sham because it was unprofitable before tax benefits were accounted for). 
276. Salem Fin., Inc., 786 F.3d at 950. 
277. See supra section I.0. 
278. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2018) (making no express mention of tribes or tribal 
governments). 
279. See Allergan, Response to Defendants’ Notice, supra note 26 at Exhibit A. 
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tribes are not immune to federal agency enforcement.280 Moreover, the 
involvement of a private claimant in IPR did not preclude PTAB from 
being able to hear the case against SMRT’s patents.281 The Federal Circuit 
highlighted three key differences between IPR and civil litigation: the 
Director’s discretion whether to institute IPR, that the PTAB may 
continue review even if the complaining party does not participate, and 
that the USPTO rules do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.282 This subsection challenges the PTAB’s and the Federal 
Circuit’s analysis. 
The features identified by the Federal Circuit do not meaningfully 
differentiate IPR from civil litigation. The standard set forth in FMC was 
that states, as sovereigns, are immune from “the type of proceedings from 
which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity 
when they agreed to enter the Union.”283 The fact that the Director has 
discretion whether to institute proceedings does not completely diminish 
the private nature of IPR. The Director may only institute IPR if a private 
party first files a petition.284 The statute does not permit the Director to 
institute IPR sua sponte. The fact that the Director may choose not to 
allow a petition to develop into IPR does discount that, from the outset, a 
private party drives IPR substantially like civil litigation. Furthermore, 
once initiated, the private petitioner may file a joint request with the patent 
holder to force the PTAB to terminate the proceedings.285 
The IPR statute contemplates that a petitioner may choose to end their 
participation during the course of the proceedings.286 In such a case, 
PTAB is permitted to “terminate the review or proceed to a final written 
decision.”287 However, the statute does not authorize PTAB to act as a 
prosecuting party in the petitioner’s place. Rather, when the petitioner 
ceases to participate it is equivalent to a party to litigation resting their 
case-in-chief. If the petitioner up to the point of non-participation has 
presented sufficient evidence for the PTAB to issue the ruling, it may do 
                                                     
280. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2017-00576, 2018 WL 1100950 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018), aff’d, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 18-1638, slip 
op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 20, 2018). 
281. Mylan Pharm., IPR2017-00576, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6; Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. 
18-1638, slip op. at 4. 
282. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. 18-1638, slip op. at 8–10. 
283. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 756 (2002). 
284. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). 
285. Id. § 317(a). 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
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so. Contrary to the finding of the Federal Circuit, this feature of IPR is 
analogous, not wholly dissimilar, to traditional civil litigation. 
The Federal Circuit further found that due to differences in rules of 
procedure, “[a]n IPR hearing is nothing like a district court patent trial.”288 
The court highlighted that IPR petitioners and patent owners could amend 
their complaint at different times and to a different extent than that of 
plaintiffs and defendants under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.289 
Further, the court found that IPR was subject to different discovery 
options. However, the Federal Circuit overlooks that for much of the 
county’s history, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not exist.290 The 
mere fact that a federal civil trial in the 1800s proceeded differently than 
a trial might today does not make either one less like private litigation. 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s finding, under the FMC standard, IPR 
shares enough of the core elements of private litigation to implicate 
sovereign immunity. IPR is an adversarial process which was purposely 
designed as a contest between a patent owner and a petitioner. The 
proceedings are only initiated after the complaint of a private party 
mirroring the complaint and pleading functions of litigation. Panels of at 
least three impartial administrative patent judges (APJs) preside over the 
proceedings.291 Lastly, the discovery process of IPR is similar to the 
discovery process in civil litigation. 
Tribal immunity may not be generally asserted in administrative 
proceedings.292 However, IPR is not like most administrative proceedings. 
Unlike federal enforcement actions where administrative agencies bring a 
case against a tribe, private parties institute IPR.293 The private party is 
then intimately involved in the proceedings and responsible for carrying 
the burden of proof of the claims before PTAB from first motion to final 
judgment.294 IPR proceedings mirror private civil actions in form.295 
While tribes may not raise sovereign immunity against a federal agency 
                                                     
288. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 18-1638, slip op. at 10 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 
20, 2018). 
289. Id. at 8–10. 
290. “The [Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure] formally went into effect on September 16, 1938.” 
Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to 
Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PENN. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (1989). 
291. 37 C.F.R. § 42 (2017). 
292. See supra section I.B.3. 
293. Supra Part 0. 
294. Id. 
295. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
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where the agency merely operates as a forum to litigate, tribes should be 
entitled to bar actions by private parties. 
The additional reasons asserted by PTAB, which were not addressed 
by the Federal Circuit on appeal, are similarly flawed. The PTAB found 
the patent regulations were “generally applicable,” and tribes were subject 
to IPR proceedings.296 This application of a narrow principle is too broad. 
It is usually true that generally applicable federal laws apply to tribes.297 
Also, most laws governing patents are “generally applicable” and do not 
upset the sovereign rights of tribes.298 Though the patent regime applies 
to tribally owned patents, it does not necessarily follow that the tribes are 
then exposed to private patent claims. Such a conclusion defies 
jurisprudence requiring Congress or the tribes to “unequivocally 
express[ ]” a waiver of sovereign immunity.299 The PTAB instead finds 
where Congress enacts a generally applicable statute, it must expressly 
exempt tribes from private actions provided for under the statute to 
implicate sovereign immunity. 
The PTAB also held an IPR proceeding is not the type of “suit” from 
which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy immunity under the 
common law because the petitioner will not receive any relief from the 
tribe.300 The PTAB notes, “the scope of the authority granted by Congress 
to the Patent Office with respect to inter partes review proceedings is 
limited to assessing the patentability of the challenged [patents].”301 Here, 
PTAB underestimates the gravity of its own proceedings. When an IPR 
petitioner requests proceedings be initiated, the request is essentially a 
request for the PTAB to void a patent owner’s rights. While there is no 
potential for petitioners to be awarded money damages or injunctive 
relief, there is no binding jurisprudence suggesting tribal immunity may 
be circumvented by suing for declaratory relief. To the contrary, in Santa 
Clara Pueblo, the plaintiff was suing the tribe for declaratory relief (in 
                                                     
296. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2017-00576, 2018 WL 1100950 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018), aff’d, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 18-1638 (Fed. 
Cir. July 20, 2018). 
297. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal 
statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes will not apply 
to them if: (1) the law touches ‘exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters’; 
(2) the application of the law to the tribe would ‘abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties’; or 
(3) there is proof ‘by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to 
apply to Indians on their reservations.”).  
298. See generally 35 U.S.C. (2018). 
299. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). 
300. Mylan Pharm., IPR2017-00576, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6. 
301. Id. at *16. 
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addition to injunctive relief), yet the Court still found a declaratory 
judgment was barred by the Tribe’s immunity.302 IPR proceedings, similar 
to a declaratory judgment,303 establish whether the patent owner has any 
rights to the patent at issue.304 Therefore, the PTAB’s distinction about the 
type of relief petitioners seek is immaterial in light of Santa Clara Pueblo. 
Lastly, PTAB claimed it did not exercise in personam jurisdiction over 
patent owners, but rather exercised jurisdiction over the patent itself and, 
therefore, did not implicate the tribe’s immunity.305 The PTAB views IPR 
as akin to in rem proceedings, where the property itself is at issue and not 
necessarily the owner.306 It remains uncertain whether in rem proceedings 
avoid implicating sovereign immunity questions all together. For instance, 
in its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court allowed in rem 
actions to proceed against State property where the property was not in 
the State’s possession.307 In IPR proceedings, a patent is in the 
“possession” of the patent holder because the patent holder always exerts 
control over the patent. Therefore, the PTAB’s analogy to in rem 
proceedings is questionable when it comes to state-owned patents. 
For tribally held patents, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence merely 
offers guidance since tribes derive their sovereignty as a matter of federal 
common law rather than the Constitution.308 If, as a rule, property owned 
by the sovereign received the benefit of the sovereign’s immunity from 
suit, then tribally held patents would enjoy the tribe’s sovereignty. The 
Court’s 2018 disposition in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe II partially 
illuminates the bounds of this question.309 The Court left open the 
possibility that actions within a state involving “immovable property” 
purchased by a tribe might not be barred by sovereign immunity in the 
                                                     
302. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58. 
303. Declaratory Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (4th ed. 1968) (“One which simply 
declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without 
ordering anything to be done.”). 
304. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018). 
305. Id. 
306. Id. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal 
property.”). 
307. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446–48 (2004) (exercise of 
bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction over a debtor’s estate to discharge a debt owed to a state does 
not infringe the state’s sovereignty); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 507–08 
(1998) (despite state claims over shipwrecked vessel, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal 
court in rem admiralty jurisdiction where the res is not in the possession of the sovereign). 
308. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[I]mmunity 
possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of the States.”). 
309. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe II, No. 17-387, slip op. (U.S. May 21, 2018). 
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first place.310 In the context of IPR proceedings, the “immovable property” 
exception is inapplicable, primarily, because the patents are not 
“immovable property.”311 
The underlying policies of the “immovable property” exception do not 
strengthen the arguments that tribal immunity ought not to be recognized 
in actions relating to tribal patents on an in rem theory.312 The concerns 
could be analogized to the patent context—allowing immune non-federal 
entities to exercise their immunity over their patents would cede federal 
sovereignty over the patent system. Unlike land, patent ownership bears 
little on the territorial integrity of the United States and therefore does not 
present the same existential threat to sovereignty as land acquisition 
might. Additionally, no patent holder is totally immune from federal 
patent review, therefore the federal government will maintain supreme 
regulatory power over the patent system.313 PTAB’s argument that tribal 
immunity should be curbed due to the in rem nature of the IPR 
proceedings does not necessarily correlate to the “immovable property” 
exception in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe II. 
The Federal Circuit and PTAB’s findings that tribes are not immune 
from IPR proceedings is inconsistent with jurisprudence on the issue. The 
lack of an express waiver by Congress, the private and adversarial nature 
of IPR, and the implication of tribal property rights all support a finding 
that tribes are generally immune from IPR as they would be from private 
actions in another forum. Therefore, to have jurisdiction to conduct IPR, 
PTAB must show the tribe waived its immunity. 
B. There Was No Waiver of Tribal Immunity 
Although a tribe may be immune from suit or a sufficiently similar 
adversarial administrative process, if it waives its immunity, it will be 
subject to the proceedings. There are two ways tribal immunity can be 
waived. First, Congress may unequivocally and expressly waive tribal 
immunity via statute.314 The fact that Senator MacAskill found it 
                                                     
310. Id. 
311. In most contexts patents are treated as personal property. See, e.g., Fleming v. Okla. Tax 
Comm’n, 157 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1946) (stating that patents are intangible personal property); 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018) (“patents shall have the attributes of personal property”). 
312. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 756 (2002). 
313. Patents may still be reviewed by the government through ex parte proceedings.  
314. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) 
(2018) (“The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over . . . (ii) any cause of action 
initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and 
conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) that is in 
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necessary to propose a bill to append an express waiver provision to the 
AIA demonstrates Congress did not include an express waiver of tribal 
immunity when it enacted the AIA.315 Second, the tribe itself may agree 
to waive its own sovereign immunity.316 Regarding the patents at issue in 
the Allergan-Mohawk agreement, SRMT did not waive tribal immunity. 
Therefore, SRMT retains its sovereign protection from IPR proceedings 
and private lawsuits concerning the patents. 
Prior to the establishment of the Allergan-Mohawk deal, Allergan 
brought a patent infringement action against several generic drug makers 
for their alleged use of elements of Allergan’s dry-eye drug, Restasis.317 
In response, the named defendants contended in federal court that the 
patents were invalid and concurrently filed a complaint with PTAB to 
institute IPR proceedings against the patents at issue.318 During the course 
of both the federal trial and the IPR proceedings, Allergan formed the 
agreement with SRMT and assigned the patents to the Tribe.319 Allergan 
and SRMT then moved to have SRMT joined or substituted as a named 
plaintiff to the patent infringement suit proceeding in federal court under 
FRCP 25(c).320 Additionally, Allergan and SRMT moved to dismiss the 
IPR proceedings, arguing that SRMT (as the patents’ owner) must be 
joined as a defendant yet could not be so, due to its sovereign immunity.321 
By voluntarily injecting itself into the patent infringement suit as a 
plaintiff, the court held that SRMT waived its sovereign immunity and 
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.322 
The more nebulous question is whether the tribe’s participation in the 
infringement proceedings in a federal court waived its immunity over 
proceedings in a separate administrative forum. In rare instances, a tribe’s 
participation in a lawsuit can “effect a waiver for limited purposes.”323 
                                                     
effect. . . .”). 
315. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified at amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Erman, supra note 40. 
316. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758–60 (1998); Quileute Indian 
Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994). 
317. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1–3 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. Immunity is primarily concerned with actions against sovereign defendants. Had the court not 
had the Tribe’s permission it would have been powerless to compel them to join as either plaintiff or 
defendant.  
323. COHEN, supra note 43, at 645. 
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There is a wealth of case law discussing whether a tribe, by filing suit, 
waived its sovereign immunity as to counterclaims.324 There is no 
question a defendant in a patent infringement suit, even one instituted by 
a tribe, may raise the defense that the patent is invalid without upsetting 
sovereign immunity.325 Yet, the question at issue here is distinct—can a 
patent infringement suit instituted by a tribe waive that tribe’s immunity 
as to a claim of invalidity brought in a separate administrative forum? This 
is a question unexplored by the courts.326 
The circuit courts’ interpretation of tribal immunity suggests the 
prosecution of patent infringement suits does not implicitly waive the 
tribe’s immunity to subsequent IPR proceedings. Although arising out of 
the same piece of property, IPR proceedings are independent from the 
patent infringement suit. The Jicarilla court found a tribe suing under a 
lease did not unequivocally waive sovereign immunity as to all suits 
arising out of that lease.327 In Jicarilla, the subsequent action was brought 
in the same forum.328 The court was unconvinced that tribally instituted 
litigation waived immunity for later suits concerning the same subject 
matter in the same forum; even less of an implied waiver exists to suits in 
a different forum. Likewise, the Oregon court, which is widely viewed as 
pressing the outer limits of the implied waiver doctrine,329 did not 
contemplate waiver to suits arising in a different forum.330 Nor was the 
Oregon judgment a new judgment, but rather a modification to a judgment 
the tribe had previously and expressly consented to.331 
The PTAB’s ruling in University of Minnesota should be troubling for 
SRMT. A core element of their business strategy is to prosecute patent 
infringement for the patents they own, while maintaining their immunity 
                                                     
324. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509–10 
(1991); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940) (“Possessing [ ] immunity 
from direct suit, we are of the opinion [that a tribe] possesses a similar immunity from cross-suits.”); 
McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A] tribe’s participation in litigation 
does not constitute consent to counterclaims asserted by the defendants in those actions.”). 
325. Even though this defense, if successful, would invalidate the tribe’s patent.  
326. But see Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that tribes “did not 
waive their immunity by intervening in [ ] administrative proceedings” because “[a]ny waiver must 
be unequivocal and may not be implied”). 
327. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1987). 
328. Id. 
329. Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 
1380 (8th Cir. 1985) (disapproving of Oregon as “press[ing] the outer boundary of what the [U.S.] 
Supreme Court intended by its plain statement in Santa Clara Pueblo”). 
330. Both actions were brought in the district court. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
331. Id. 
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from IPR proceedings. University of Minnesota suggests PTAB may not 
allow SRMT to have it both ways. However, SRMT may argue that a 
tribe’s patent infringement suits do not constitute an implicit waiver of 
immunity for IPR proceedings. First, the policies underlying Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity of “unfairness” and “inconsistency” are 
wholly dissimilar from those which control tribal immunity. Second, 
tribal immunity from IPR would not prejudice a would-be patent 
infringement defendant. 
While “unfairness” and “inconsistency” may be the fundamental 
policies of implied waiver of state sovereign immunity, the policies 
surrounding tribal immunity are based on different foundations.332 The 
Court visited the idea of fairness and tribal immunity in Kiowa.333 The 
Court observed tribes becoming more active in off-reservation 
commercial activity and determined whether such off-reservation 
activities qualified as an implicit waiver of tribal immunity.334 It noted 
unfair situations could arise from preserving tribal sovereignty in the 
commercial sphere; “[i]n this economic context, immunity can harm those 
who are unaware they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal 
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort 
victims.”335 Nevertheless, the Court did not find mere unfairness to be 
sufficient to overcome tribal immunity. Instead, the Court “defer[red] to 
the role Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment.”336 
In the Eleventh Amendment context, the Court has repeatedly held that 
Congress is not authorized to abrogate sovereign immunity merely out of 
concerns of fairness or public policy.337 However, in the tribal immunity 
context, Congress, not the courts, is responsible for regulating the fairness 
of tribal immunity. Furthermore, Congress may expand, limit, or abrogate 
a tribe’s immunity for virtually any reason or no reason at all.338 It is not 
within the purview of the courts to fill the gap where Congress has 
declined to act. Where Congress created express exceptions for tribes in 
generally applicable statutory schemes, it has done so to create a unique 
                                                     
332. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758–60 (1998). 
333. Id.; Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994). 
334. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758–60. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 
(1999) (holding that neither Commerce Clause nor Patent Clause provided Congress with authority 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims in Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act.); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996). 
338. United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940). 
15 - Brickey.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:53 PM 
1490 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1449 
  
advantage for the tribes’ benefit, which some may call “unfair.”339 
Therefore, the PTAB’s finding of mere “unfairness,” which warranted the 
waiver of state sovereign immunity, does not extend to tribes’ sovereign 
immunity. 
Contrary to what the PTAB suggests, maintaining sovereign immunity 
for IPR proceedings, despite a pending patent infringement suit, would 
not prejudice the non-sovereign party because they may raise the same 
claims in the infringement suit as they would raise in IPR. When any 
plaintiff—including a sovereign—institutes a patent infringement suit, the 
defendant may raise the defense of invalidity based on prior art.340 The 
defense of invalidity will absolve the defendant of liability if the 
defendant can show the patent is invalid because either (1) the exact 
claimed invention was invented earlier by someone else, (2) the nature of 
the differences between the claim and the prior art would have rendered 
the subject matter of the claim obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art at the time of the claimed invention, or (3) some other ground of 
unpatentability.341 
The burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence falls 
on the defendant in a patent infringement suit342; the standard of proof in 
IPR is the preponderance of evidence.343 This difference does not 
sufficiently prejudice the defendant to warrant a waiver of sovereign 
immunity. In Lapides, the case cited by the PTAB to advance its assertion 
that unfairness warrants waiver, the state’s use of its immunity would have 
resulted in the plaintiffs’ claims being barred in all potential forums.344 
Here, the patent challenger, as a defense to patent infringement, may still 
make the claim in district court that the patent is invalid. A patent 
challenger’s burden of proof in district court has never been found to be 
unduly onerous or plainly prejudicial. Although the PTAB may be a more 
challenger-friendly forum, it is not the only forum for the patent 
challenger. 
Tribes who initiate a patent infringement suit have not waived 
immunity from IPR proceedings over the same patents. Several circuits 
have illustrated that the limited scope of implied waiver of tribal immunity 
does not allow independent private actions based on the same subject 
matter as a tribally initiated suit, let alone an independent action in another 
forum. Despite PTAB’s recent proclamation that a state’s prosecution of 
                                                     
339. See supra section I.0. 
340. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018). 
341. Id. 
342. State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
343. 35 U.S.C § 316(e). 
344. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
15 - Brickey.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:53 PM 
2018] USING TRIBAL IMMUNITY TO SHIELD PATENTS 1491 
 
a patent infringement action waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from subsequent IPR proceedings, the fundamental differences between 
tribal immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity make the holding 
inapplicable to tribes. Further, even as applied to the states, the PTAB’s 
University of Minnesota decision is suspect in its reasoning that immunity 
from IPR would impermissibly and unfairly prejudice would-be 
claimants. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of the Allergan-Mohawk 
agreement is not undone by SRMT’s prosecution of patent infringement 
actions. 
C. The Agreement Is Not a “Sham” 
Many have referred to the agreement between SRMT and Allergan as 
a “sham,” a word also used by the district court who first grappled with 
this agreement.345 The mere fact the patent assignment agreement may 
have been a sham only affects the enforceability of the agreement. For 
instance, if the entire agreement was a sham, SRMT and Allergan would 
no longer have an obligation to perform their respective contractual 
duties. Here, the concern is not to the enforceability of the agreement, but 
whether the ownership of the patent actually changed hands. It did. The 
question of whether or not the patent assignment itself would have been 
enforceable in court is moot. Allergan already assigned the patents to the 
tribe. Even if a court declared the assignment agreement a sham now, it 
would not affect the ownership of the patents. 
When critics label an agreement a “sham,” they are often simply 
communicating “I don’t like it” rather than using the word consistently 
with the narrow legal doctrine of “sham” agreements. New York’s 
definition of “sham” is instructive as the Allergan-Mohawk agreement is 
governed by New York contract law.346 As discussed in Part III, New 
York courts hold “a sham transaction is one that never really took place” 
or “there was nothing of substance to be realized . . . from [the] 
transaction beyond a tax deduction.”347 
Here, an actual exchange of valuable consideration supports the 
agreement’s validity. In the agreement at issue, Allergan conferred the 
patents to SRMT.348 In the same stroke, SRMT gave an unlimited and 
                                                     
345. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
346. Allergan, Response to Defendants’ Notice, supra note 26, at Exhibit A.  
347. In re Bernard S. Hodes, Nos. 807328 and 808528, 1993 WL 498231, at *18 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. Ct. Nov. 24, 1993). 
348. Allergan, Response to Defendants’ Notice, supra note 26, at Exhibit A. 
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exclusive license to Allergan.349 At first glance it seems as though no 
exchange actually occurred; Allergan remains the effective “owner” of the 
patent in all but name. In exchange for the license, Allergan agreed to pay 
royalties of approximately $15 million per year to SRMT.350 Allergan also 
gave an additional $13 million with SRMT to go with the patents for the 
Tribe’s promise to never waive tribal immunity over the patents.351 SRMT 
also retained enforcement rights.352 Here, ignoring the patent rights 
Allergan ultimately retained in the agreement, there is still an actual 
transaction taking place. Allergan receives SRMT’s promise to assert 
tribal sovereignty over the patents (something it previously would have 
had the right to do, or not do), and Allergan gives the tribe de jure 
ownership of the patents, patent enforcement rights, and royalties. 
Therefore, there was an actual transaction, and the transaction materially 
changed the economic position of both parties.353 
The Allergan-Mohawk agreement does not unduly burden the patent 
system. Nested within the doctrine of “sham” is public policy concern. By 
targeting agreements where “there was nothing of substance to be 
realized . . . from [the] transaction beyond a tax deduction,” New York 
highlights a concern for agreements seeking to undermine broadly 
applicable state-imposed systems.354 Allergan-Mohawk critics may intend 
to invoke these connected-yet-distinct public policy concerns by using the 
word “sham.” Therefore, the question at issue is whether the Allergan-
Mohawk agreement is void because it violates the public policy of 
allowing patents to be reviewed through IPR. 
In fact, Congress may not have to choose between the patent system 
and tribal sovereignty. Recall tribes are not immune to suits brought by 
the federal government. In the AIA, Congress included an ex parte 
proceeding that the Director may invoke.355 If a party desires to challenge 
                                                     
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 3 (“The Tribe, in turn, retained enforcement rights and rights to practice the patents in 
all other fields.”). 
353. PTAB emphasizes whether the agreement is supported by adequate consideration. However, 
consideration is relevant only to the extent a party to an agreement seeks to enforce the agreement 
against the other party. Here, this is not the issue. The issue is whether Allergan assigned the patents 
to the Tribe. Assignments of a patent need not be supported by consideration. They may be gifted. 
Here, Allergan did sign ownership of the patents over to SRMT. Whether they received anything in 
return is not an issue. 
354. In re Bernard S. Hodes, Nos. 807328 and 808528, 1993 WL 498231, at *18 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. Ct. Nov. 24, 1993). 
355. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2018). 
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a patent held by a sovereign, the party can request the Director of PTO 
reexamine the patent for patentability. If there is a question of 
patentability, the Director may institute an ex parte proceeding wherein 
the patent-holder sends in a written statement on the patent’s merits. 
While the party requesting the proceedings receives the opportunity to 
reply, the process is instituted, controlled, and decided at the discretion of 
the Director. This process is far less adversarial than IPR and shares far 
fewer similarities with civil litigation.356 Further, the federal government, 
through the Director and not a private actor, is ultimately the party 
instituting the proceedings. It is unlikely a tribe would be immune from 
ex parte patent review. 
Congress intended for patents to become more cheaply and easily 
challenged when it created the IPR by passing the AIA.357 Since the 
creation of IPR, high numbers of “bad patents” have been eliminated from 
the patent system allowing for more innovators to make use of the 
formerly monopolized technologies.358 Agreements to stall, avoid, or 
inhibit IPR inherently run counter to Congress’s intent to eliminate bad 
patents. Yet when considering the Allergan-Mohawk agreement, unlike 
an agreement between private parties that undermines the IPR process, 
Congress’s intent in administering the patent system is not the only public 
policy at issue. The intent to expose patents to IPR is in tension with 
Congress’s longstanding interest in leveraging tribes’ unique character to 
foster economic development.359 
The Allergan-Mohawk agreement, and those like it, have caused 
millions of dollars to flow into impoverished tribal communities. Rather 
than building casinos, resorts, or toxic waste facilities on tribal land,360 
these agreements serve to engage tribes in technologically advanced 
industries. Congress should be cautious and not react too hastily to this 
new development. While some legislators view this type of agreement as 
“unfair,” Congress should look to how it affords tribes unique advantages 
in the marketplace. Through tax exemption, tax credits for non-tribal 
investors, various regulatory allowances, and tribal contractor 
                                                     
356. Comparison of Post-Grant Proceeding, RATNERPRESTIA (2013), 
http://www.rppostgrant.com/ComparisonCharts/post-grant-review-comparison.html 
[https://perma.cc/E3UN-WKHK]. 
357. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 (2011). 
358. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 235, at 12. 
359. See supra section I.0. 
360. EARTHTALK, Reservations About Toxic Waste: Native American Tribes Encouraged to Turn 
Down Lucrative Hazardous Disposal Deals, SCI. AM. (Mar. 31, 2010), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-talk-reservations-about-toxic-waste/ 
[https://perma.cc/4S8S-TWQZ]. 
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preferences, Congress strategically leverages tribes’ unique quasi-
sovereign character. Here, Congress has another opportunity to do so. By 
allowing Allergan-Mohawk-type deals to continue, a massive revenue 
stream—and an entirely new marketplace—opens for tribes. 
Senate Bill 1948,361 introduced by Senator McCaskill in 2017, would 
definitively close this substantial revenue source to the tribes. 
Subsection (b) of the Bill states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, an Indian tribe may not assert sovereign immunity as a defense in a 
review that is conducted under chapter 31 of title 35, United States 
Code.”362 This would unequivocally abrogate tribal immunity for IPR 
proceedings relating to tribal patents. Nevertheless, the question of 
whether the Allergan-Mohawk agreement is void for violating public 
policy requires a balancing of Congress’s interest in maintaining IPR 
proceedings and Congress’s interest in promoting tribal economic 
development. The courts, and certainly PTAB, are the improper forums 
for this balancing to occur. Because this question cuts to the core of tribal 
immunity, “[i]t is fundamentally Congress’s job, not [the Court’s], to 
determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity. The special brand of 
sovereignty the tribes retain—both its nature and its extent—rests in the 
hands of Congress.”363 
CONCLUSION 
Contracts like the Allergan-Mohawk agreement open up a field of 
lucrative opportunities for tribes to leverage their sovereign character for 
economic gain. While many commentators, would-be-patent challengers, 
and even judges may not enjoy the result of these agreements, general 
indignation is not sufficient to upset the jurisprudence governing tribal 
immunity established over the past two centuries. Tribal sovereignty bars 
private action against tribes. Only Congress has the authority to abrogate 
tribal immunity. Because Congress has not unequivocally stated 
otherwise, tribes—and their patents—remain immune from privately 
instituted IPR proceedings. Courts should respect the sovereignty of tribes 
and defer to Congress to clearly articulate whether immunity ought to 
stand in IPR proceedings. Congress should not undercut the Allergan-
Mohawk deal too hastily. Rather, given Congress’s longstanding interest 
in promoting the economic development of tribes, it should observe 
whether the economic benefit conferred on tribes through such 
agreements outweighs the burdens on the patent system. 
                                                     
361. S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017). 
362. Id. at § 1(b). 
363. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014). 
